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The current recovery has seen steady growth in output but no corresponding rise in employment. 
A look at layoff trends and industry job gains and losses in 2001-03 suggests that structural
change—the permanent relocation of workers from some industries to others—may help explain
the stalled growth in jobs.
A
surge in payroll jobs used to be a reliable
sign of the end of a recession—but not
any longer. When the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), the accepted arbiter of
business cycle dating,recently designated November 2001
as the end of the nation’s latest recession, it based 
its decision largely on the growth of output (GDP).1 By the
end of June 2003,GDP had risen 4.5 percent from its low in 
the third quarter of 2001 and significantly exceeded its 
pre-recession peak. While the members of the Bureau’s 
dating committee saw the strong growth of this indicator
as persuasive evidence that the downturn was over,they
acknowledged that their decision was made very difficult
by the “divergent behavior of employment.”What troubled
the committee was that payroll employment,which would
normally rise in tandem with output,had shown no sign of
recovery.Indeed,the payroll numbers fell almost 0.4 per-
cent in 2002 and another 0.3 percent through July 2003.
In this edition of Current Issues, we explore why the
recovery from the most recent recession has brought no
growth in jobs.We advance the hypothesis that structural
changes—permanent shifts in the distribution of workers
throughout the economy—have contributed significantly
to the sluggishness in the job market.
We find evidence of structural change in two features of
the 2001 recession: the predominance of permanent job
losses over temporary layoffs and the relocation of jobs
from one industry to another.The data suggest that most of
the jobs added during the recovery have been new posi-
tions in different firms and industries,not rehires.In our
view,this shift to new jobs largely explains why the payroll
numbers have been so slow to rise: Creating jobs takes
longer than recalling workers to their old positions and is
riskier in the current uncertain environment.
A Second Jobless Recovery
The NBER’s choice of November 2001 as the end, or
“trough,”of the recession that began in March 2001 means
that the United States has been in a recovery for roughly
twenty months.The trough marks not only the lowest point
of economic activity but also the beginning of the expan-
sion or rising phase of the business cycle.
Although the weak performance of the labor market 
during the current recovery has been surprising,it is not
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sion was dubbed the “jobless recovery”because the economy
added so few jobs during the first year and a half after the
expansion began.
The current recovery parallels this earlier recovery in
important respects. In 1991-92, output growth rose fairly
steadily,but job growth remained near zero for more than a
year. In 2002-03, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP has grown
each quarter at annualized rates between 1.3 and 5.0 percent,
while payroll growth averaged -0.4 percent at an annualized
rate through July.2
The sluggishness ofpayroll growth during the 1991-92 and
current recoveries stands in sharp contrast to the vigorous
rebound in employment during earlier recoveries (Chart 1).
To be sure,these earlier recoveries had rocky moments,with
occasional jobless intervals.At the start of any recovery,many
employers will delay hires or recalls for a time to be certain
that the increase in demand will continue. Nevertheless,
although the job market resurgence in the past may often
have lagged the output recovery by one quarter,only during
the two most recent recoveries has the divergence between
job and output growth persisted for a longer period.3
The divergent paths of output and employment in 1991-92
and 2002-03 suggest the emergence of a new kind of recovery,
one driven mostly by productivity increases rather than pay-
roll gains.The fact that no influx of new workers occurred in
the two most recent recoveries means that output grew
because workers were producing more.Although one might
speculate that output increased because workers were putting
in longer days,average hours worked by employees actually
changed little during this and the previous jobless recovery.
The parallels between the two most recent recoveries
raise hopes that the current recovery will ultimately follow
the same course as its predecessor. After about eighteen
months, the 1991-92 recovery ushered in very strong
employment growth and the longest economic expansion of
the postwar period.But while we cannot know when—or
how vigorously—job growth will revive during this recov-
ery,we can explore why the recovery is jobless now.
The Role of Structural Change
Recessions mix cyclical and structural adjustments.Cyclical
adjustments are reversible responses to lulls in demand,
while structural adjustments transform a firm or industry
by relocating workers and capital.The job losses associated
with cyclical shocks are temporary: at the end of the reces-
sion,industries rebound and laid-off workers are recalled 
to their old firms or readily find comparable employment
with another firm. Job losses that stem from structural
changes,however,are permanent:as industries decline,jobs
are eliminated, compelling workers to switch industries,
sectors,locations,or skills in order to find a new job.
A preponderance of structural—as opposed to cyclical—
adjustments during the most recent recession would help 
to explain why employment has languished during the re-
covery.If job growth now depends on the creation of new
positions in different firms and industries,then we would
expect a long lag before employment rebounded.Employers
incur risks in creating new jobs,and require additional time
to establish and fill positions.
In the remainder of this section,then,we look for evi-
dence that structural change played a dominant role in the
2001 recession.Our investigation centers on two questions:
Did temporary layoffs decline relative to permanent job
losses in the recession? Were many of these lost jobs relo-
cated to different industries?4 Throughout the analysis,we
compare the 2001 experience with earlier recessions.
Temporary versus Permanent Layoffs
In a temporary layoff,an employer “suspends”an employee’s
job,generally because of slack demand.Both the employer
and the employee expect their relationship to resume when
economic conditions improve.The employer may even help
the employee apply for unemployment insurance benefits so
that he or she is more likely to wait out the layoff instead of
taking another job.When layoffs are temporary,subsequent
recalls can take place quickly,fueling fast payroll growth.
By contrast, a permanent layoff severs the relationship
between the employer and the employee. The employer 
eliminates the job for any of a variety of reasons,including a
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Note: The shaded area indicates the length of the 2001 recession.
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permanent fall in demand,technological change,reorgani-
zation of production,and local or international outsourcing.
Even an employer that ultimately decides to fill the job again
will need to search for a new employee.Meanwhile,the laid-off
worker must find a new job and the employer that hires him or
her must create a new position and conduct a search to fill it.
Thus,when layoffs are permanent,job recovery is slower.
To assess whether the job losses in the 2001 recession have
been mostly permanent or temporary—and thus whether
they are indicative ofstructural or cyclical change—we exam-
ine the contribution of temporary layoffs to the unemploy-
ment rate.We track this measure over the past six recessions
(Chart 2).In the four recessions before 1990,unemployment
from temporary layoffs rose throughout the downturn and
fell sharply after the trough, adding substantially to the
run-up and then the decline in total unemployment.In the
1990-91 and 2001 recessions,by contrast,temporary layoffs
contributed little to the path of unemployment.These layoffs
barely increased in the 1990-91 recession and figured even
less importantly in the 2001 recession.5 While the reduced
role of temporary layoffs is not proof that structural changes
were more prominent during the two most recent recessions,
it is clearly consistent with that view.
Job Relocations
Structural adjustments change the location of jobs in an
economy.To determine whether the job adjustments made
during the 2001 recession by the seventy major U.S.indus-
tries—those identified by two digits in the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) system—were primarily
structural or cyclical, we track the direction of job flows 
during and after the recession. If an industry’s job losses 
(or gains) during the recession were quickly reversed once
the economy began to recover,we classify the job adjustments
as cyclical.If,instead,the outflow ofjobs from (or the inflow of
jobs to) the industry continued during the recovery,we con-
clude that the jobs have been permanently relocated and we
classify the adjustments as structural.We can then aggregate
the adjustments made by individual industries to establish
whether structural or cyclical changes predominated.
We apply our method first to the 1980 and 1981-82 down-
turns,treating this “double-dip”in economic activity as a
single recession that began in 1980 and ended in 1982.
Chart 3 plots the major industries on a grid in which the
horizontal axis measures job growth in the recession and the
vertical axis measures job growth in the twelve months of
recovery that followed.The position of each industry on the
grid reveals whether its job adjustments have been struc-
tural or cyclical.Note that the size of the circle representing a
given industry reflects that industry’s share of all jobs in the
economy,measured at the business cycle peak.
General building contractors and primary metal fabrica-
tors had large job losses during the recession, but during 
the year following,they recouped jobs.Accordingly,these
industries appear to the left of the vertical axis and above 
the horizontal axis. These industries, like the others in 
the northwest quadrant, had cyclical—or more precisely,
procyclical—job flows; the job losses and subsequent job
recoveries paralleled the contraction and expansion phases
of the business cycle.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions by the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Chart 2
Contribution of Temporary Layoffs to the Unemployment Rate
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Job Adjustments by Industries during the Recession and Recovery 
of the Early 1980s 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
Note: The 1980 and 1981-82 downturns are treated as one long recession.In clear contrast, oil and gas extraction firms—in the
southeast quadrant—gained jobs during the recession and
lost them during the recovery.These adjustments are also
cyclical,but because the job gains and losses ran counter to
the phases of the business cycle,they are customarily termed
countercyclical.Countercyclical job flows are rare; indeed,
the small number and size of the circles in the southeast
quadrant suggest that only a few small industries experi-
enced such flows in the 1980s.
Securities and commodities brokers, positioned in the
northeast quadrant,gained jobs during both the recession
and the recovery.The continuation of the job gains indicates
that this industry grew structurally during the early 1980s.
Finally,railroad transportation,in the southwest quad-
rant,shed jobs throughout the recession and the expansion.
The ongoing loss of jobs means that this industry declined
structurally.
A look at the overall distribution in Chart 3 suggests 
that about half of the industries fell in the cyclical quad-
rants (northwest and southeast) and half in the structural
quadrants (northeast and southwest).Thus,in the 1980-82
recession,it appears that job flows were almost evenly split
between structural and cyclical changes.
How,then,do the job flows in the 2001 recession and sub-
sequent recovery compare with those in the early 1980s?
Chart 4 shows the distribution of major U.S.industries for
the recent period. The difference from the pattern of the
early 1980s is quite stark:now,the industries cluster heavily
in the two structural quadrants.Most of the industries that
lost jobs during the recession—for example,communica-
tions,electronic equipment,and securities and commodities
brokers—are still losing jobs. Balancing the structural 
losses of these industries,however,are the structural gains 
of others.For example,nondepository financial institutions,
an industry grouping that includes mortgage brokers,added
jobs during both the recession and the recovery.The trend
revealed in Chart 4 is one in which jobs are relocated 
from some industries to others,not reclaimed by the same
industries that had lost them earlier. The chart provides 
persuasive evidence that structural change predominated in
the most recent recession.
To get a clearer sense of how the 2001 recession compares
with earlier episodes,we add up the shares of employment at
the business cycle peak held by industries in each quadrant
for recessions in four different periods: the mid-1970s,the
early 1980s,1990-91,and 2001.6Then we compare the shares
in the two cyclical quadrants with the shares in the two
structural quadrants for each recession (Chart 5).The down-
turns in the mid-1970s and early 1980s show an even mix of
cyclical and structural adjustments.That is, during these
episodes, about half of employment was in industries
affected structurally and half in industries affected cycli-
cally.The pattern changed in the early 1990s,when indus-
tries undergoing structural adjustments increased their
share of total employment to 57 percent. The greatest
change,however,is apparent in the 2001 downturn,when 
79 percent of employees worked in industries affected more
by structural shifts than by cyclical shifts.
This comparison provides further evidence that the re-
allocation ofemployment between industries was the primary
pattern in 1990-91 and 2001.Together with our findings on
temporary layoffs,it suggests that the two most recent reces-
sions were more strongly structural than recessions past.7
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Chart 5
Share of Total Employment in Industries Undergoing Cyclical
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Reasons for Increased Structural Change
Why might structural changes now account for a larger share
of the job losses and gains during recessions? Although a
definitive answer to this question must await further
research,we outline here three possible “stories”that might
explain the dominance of structural shifts: First,the struc-
tural decline observed in many industries might be a 
reaction to a period of overexpansion. Second, improved
monetary and fiscal policy may have reduced cyclical swings
in employment,leaving structural shifts as the prevailing
form of change.Third,innovations in firm management may
be promoting a structural shift toward leaner staffing.
According to the first story, industries that attract too
much investment during a boom may have to “pay it back”
later by reducing their workforce.Some analysts contend,for
example,that too much capital was invested in high-tech and
telecommunications industries during the late 1990s.If this
assessment is correct, then competitive pressures might
cause these industries to shrink during the subsequent
recession and recovery.
To determine whether such a correction may have taken
place,we look for industries that grew rapidly during the
1990s but lost jobs during the 2001 recession and continued
to decline during the recovery.In Chart 4,the circles repre-
senting the eighteen industries whose employment grew
fastest during the 1990s are colored green.Significantly,the
chart shows seven of these eighteen industries to be struc-
turally declining.8 The large proportion of industries that
have switched from fast growth to steady decline suggests
that overinvestment in some industries during the 1990s
may in fact be a key force suppressing job growth.
The second story suggests that structural adjustments
may now dominate job gains and losses because both mone-
tary policy and fiscal policy have become much more 
effective in damping purely cyclical swings in employment.9
If policy successfully counteracted the transmission of
fluctuations to the most cyclically sensitive portions of the
economy, then the feedback effects from these sectors to 
others would no longer deepen recessions. Moreover, the
remaining fluctuations would likely be structural.The behav-
ior of housing investment and consumer durable goods
expenditures in the 2001 recession supports this contention.
Normally very susceptible to cyclical changes, these two 
sectors showed unusual vigor in both jobs and output during
the downturn. This display of strength in sectors heavily
influenced by monetary policy actions suggests that sound
policy may have averted some of the usual cyclical job losses.
According to the third story,new management strategies
at firms may be contributing to a structural reduction in
some industry jobs by promoting lean staffing as part of a
broader drive to reduce costs and increase efficiency.
Employers that have adopted such strategies are likely to see
a recession not as an event to be weathered but as an oppor-
tunity—or even a mandate—to reorganize production per-
manently,close less efficient facilities,and cull staff.Many of
these employers have also initiated operational changes,
such as just-in-time delivery and outsourcing, to smooth
fluctuations in employment and swings in inventory and
production.10 Together, these strategic and operational
changes could accelerate the pace of structural change.
Other management innovations and labor market trends
may have encouraged structural change.Performance-based
executive compensation has enhanced managers’incentives
to adopt more efficient staffing and inventory control prac-
tices. It is also replacing older systems of compensation 
that linked pay to the number of employees managed.
Workplace constraints and incentives that in the past
encouraged temporary layoffs have been eased.For example,
fewer employers are now bound by union contracts,which
often call for temporary layoffs in the case of slack work.In
1956, 34 percent of private nonagricultural workers were
covered by union contracts; in 2002,that figure had slipped
to 9.4 percent.11In addition,rule changes by the federal gov-
ernment during the 1980s prompted states’unemployment
insurance programs to shift more of the costs of frequent
layoffs onto the responsible employers—an action that could
discourage employers from using temporary layoffs.12
Instead offurloughing permanent workers,firms increas-
ingly hire temporary help when they are busiest and then cut
back when demand falls.Indeed,firms’ use of temporary 
or contract employees to smooth labor needs has grown 
substantially.In January 1972,the personnel supply industry
(SIC 7360) had only 214,000 jobs;in September 2000,jobs in
the industry peaked at 3,965,000.13 All else equal, this
approach yields a smaller permanent workforce,more tem-
porary workers,and more permanent layoffs.
Weak Job Creation or Widespread Job Destruction?
Changes in payroll employment are net figures,reflecting the
difference between jobs added and jobs eliminated.Without
knowing the counts for these two components,we cannot tell
whether the recent declines in the payroll numbers stem 
primarily from weak job creation or from widespread 
job destruction. A clue, however, comes from the new 
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which 
measures labor market dynamics since December 2000.14
Annual averages of these data for 2001 and 2002 show that
both job layoffs and new job creation (and vacancies)
declined slightly in 2002.The drop in layoffs largely rules 
out the notion that job destruction is the key factor;the dropin new jobs suggests some role for weak job creation.
Other research (Davis,Haltiwanger,and Schuh 1996; Figura
2002a,b) has shown that creation tends to surge during job-
growth booms—conditions very unlike those that prevail
now.15 Together,these findings suggest that the reason for
the contraction in payrolls could be too few jobs created.
Why might employers be restraining their hiring? Two
likely causes are increased uncertainty and financial market
weaknesses. Uncertainty can delay or deter firms from 
hiring new employees and thus lengthen the lags between
structural job cuts and new hires.Geopolitical uncertainty
arguably increased over the latest recovery at least through
March 2003,when the fighting began in Iraq.Another source
of uncertainty has been the controversy over corporate gov-
ernance and accounting standards.Firms preoccupied with
the need to identify and establish effective internal controls
may defer the creation of new jobs.Finally,structural change
itself may have given rise to uncertainty.In periods of rapid
change,it is hard for investors,companies,and workers to
know which firms and industries will require more jobs.
Financial market weakness can also depress job creation
by curtailing firms’ investments in job-creating projects.
Such “financial headwinds”were blamed for extending the
1990-91 recession and cited as a reason for monetary easing
at that time by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.16
In the current recovery,financial headwinds (particularly for
risky new ventures) might arise from the collapse of initial
public offerings and venture capital financing, widening 
corporate bond spreads,and the stock market correction.
Uncertainty and financial headwinds likely constrain new
job creation more than they do rehires into old jobs,since the
latter are less risky.Thus,regardless of whether these forces
are more severe than normal,they may be having a greater
impact because of the large job relocations now under way.
Mitigating Factors:Unemployment and Wages
Although the current jobless recovery appears even weaker
than the last one,two important indicators suggest that it
may be less severe for workers: The unemployment rate
remains relatively low,and real wage growth remains high.
Before its jump to 6.4 percent in June 2003,unemploy-
ment during this recovery held steady between 5.5 percent
and 6.1 percent.This range is both lower and narrower than
that observed in the early 1990s. What accounts for the 
difference? First,self-employment swelled by half a million
from March 2002 to April 2003.The newly self-employed are
often excluded from payroll job counts,but they also leave 
the ranks of the unemployed. Second, a fall in labor force 
participation from its April 2000 peak of 67.4 percent puts
the current rate (66.2 percent) at 1993 levels.Discouraged
workers account for just 6 percent of those who have left the
labor force.Teenagers,by contrast,make up about half of the
net exiters; they are staying in school longer,working less
while in school, and studying more during the summer
(Kirkland 2002)—all arguably beneficial trends.
The current recovery may also pose fewer hardships for
workers because real wages have grown strongly during the
recession and recovery,in line with productivity improve-
ments.At 2 percent per year overall,real wage growth is well
above 1991-92 rates and the average for postwar recessions.
Conclusion
The period after the 2001 recession will be remembered as the
second jobless recovery.Our inquiry into the reasons for the
current labor market slump suggests that structural change
has played an important role.Industries that lost jobs during
the recession have continued to shrink during the recovery,
and permanent job losses have eclipsed temporary layoffs.
The largely permanent nature of this recession’s job losses
could explain why jobs have been so slow to materialize.An
unusually high share of unemployed workers must now find
new positions in different firms or industries.The task of
finding such jobs,difficult and time-consuming under the
best of conditions,is likely to be even more complicated now,
when financial market weakness and economic uncertainty
prevail.In such an environment,firms may hesitate to create
new jobs because of the risks involved in expanding their
businesses or undertaking new ventures.Some support for
this interpretation comes from the findings of the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,which suggest that the
current shortfall in payroll growth owes more to low job 
creation than to widespread job elimination.
Despite the paucity of new jobs,two marked divergences
from the 1991-92 recovery may have mitigated the harshness
of the current experience for workers: Unemployment is 
relatively low,and real wage growth has remained surpris-
ingly strong for a recession and recovery.
Although our analysis has focused on the recent past
rather than the future,our findings suggest that a return to
job growth may require a mix of two ingredients: improved
financing options for riskier ventures and resolution of
current uncertainties,including time for the dust to settle
from all the recent structural changes.
Notes
1. See <http://www.nber.org/cycles/july2003.html> for the July 17, 2003,
announcement by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
2. Schweitzer (2003) and Schreft and Singh (2003) identify additional features
of the jobless recovery.
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3. Increases in GDP coincided with declines in employment during recoveries
in 1951:3 (almost two years after the trough in 1949:4),1954:3 (one quarter
after the trough),1975:2 (again,one quarter after the trough),1991:2,1991:4,
and 1992:1 (one,three,and four quarters after the trough,respectively).
4. See Figura (2002b) for an alternative measure of the degree of structural
change during business cycles.Unfortunately,his data do not extend to the
current recession,are annual,and cover only manufacturing.
5. As Chart 4 suggests,however,the use of temporary layoffs for other adjust-
ments has not fallen off in the same way.For example,employers still use them
to furlough workers during slow times for agriculture or tourism.
6. Changes during each recession are measured from NBER peak to NBER
trough.We define the recovery period in technical terms,as the first twelve
months after each trough. Qualitative results change little, however, if we 
interpret recoveries in a looser sense—for example,as extending up to the first
seventeen months after the trough.To control for different labor force growth
during the recessions and recoveries,we subtract average job losses or gains
from each industry’s change.This procedure centers the distribution of indus-
tries around the origin for each recession/recovery. Thus, job changes are 
measured in relative rather than absolute terms, while the location of the
industries relative to each other is preserved.
7. Our results,based on aggregate data,illuminate only the broadest outlines
of workers’movements.Further research,using data on individual industries,
will be needed before we can fully understand workers’transitions during
recent recessions.Moreover,as the expansion progresses,we will be in a better
position to see whether the job losses we interpret as structural do in fact 
persist,or—alternatively—whether the current jobless recovery should be
attributed simply to slower than usual employment adjustments.
8. The seven are special trade contractors (SIC 1700), air transportation 
(SIC 4500),transportation services (SIC 4700),communications (SIC 4800),
securities and commodities brokers (SIC 4200),amusement and recreation
services (SIC 7900),and museums,botanical gardens,and zoos (SIC 8400).
9. For the argument that monetary policy is now geared more directly toward
reducing fluctuations in output and inflation,see Boivin and Giannoni (2002).
10. For the argument that technological improvements in inventory manage-
ment explain much of the reduced variability of output,see Kahn,McConnell,
and Perez-Quiros (2002) and McConnell,Mosser,and Perez-Quiros (1999).
11. See Freeman and Medoff(1984,p.221) and “Union Members in 2002,”USDL
03-88 <ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/union2.txt>,February 25,2003.
12. See Vroman (1989) for a discussion of the history and issues relating to the
experience rating of unemployment insurance.
13. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics payroll data, during the 2001 
recession, personnel supply jobs shrank by 14.5 percent. This industry
accounted for 531,000 payroll job losses,or 39 percent of the total.
14. For a description of the JOLTS data,see <http://www.bls.gov/jlt>.
15. Davis,Haltiwanger,and Schuh (1996) study gross job flows in manufactur-
ing during the 1970s and 1980s.Figura (2002a,b) uses the same data,extended
through 1991.
16. See the mention of“fifty-mile-an-hour headwinds”in “Performance of the
U.S. Economy,” Greenspan’s testimony before the Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate, January 21, 1997, available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/testimony/1997/19970121.htm>.
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